VILLAGE AND HAMLET ELECTIONS AS A MEANS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE:

Before there can be a productive discussion about the process of political socialization in a given system, a great deal must be known about the political culture in which it operates, about the interrelationships of roles and their functions, and the manner in which specific structures develop over time. It is the author's contention that only through analysis of structural change over time does the symbiosis between value systems and their political manifestations become apparent. More particularly, the meaning villagers give to elections can only be evaluated in terms of the village culture and the evolution of its structures of leadership.

The following paper gives a somewhat impressionistic analysis of the evolution of village leadership structures and proceeds to a more rigorous examination of the contemporary electoral process in choosing that leadership. The observations presented here are essentially those on which the Village and Hamlet Leadership Training Program at the National Training Center at Vung Tau is based. Considering that over 200,000 village and hamlet leaders and cadres of all levels have been exposed to this directed program of political socialization since 1965, it is unfortunate that constraints of time and space preclude the comprehensive presentation this subject deserves.

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"The road to self-determination is a long and rocky one. You may not live to see the end of it. But if you do not go down that road, there is no future for you, or for your sons, or for Viet-Nam!"

The scene is a training hamlet at the National Training Center in Vung Tau, South Viet-Nam. Two thousand three hundred elected village and hamlet officials squat in the sand listening as the Commandant, Colonel Nguyen Be, tries to convince them of the government's sincerity in bestowing effective autonomy in local decision-making on them and their villages.

"You are the boss of your own house. Would you permit anyone to come into your house and tell you what to do? No. If I come to your house, I come as your guest, but you are the host and I must respect your authority."

The year is 1969, and this is the first class of elected village and hamlet officials to be trained at the National Training Center. Although most of the participants have received some administrative instruction at training centers in their home provinces, this is the first time most of them have been exposed to Colonel Be.

"People in a village are like bees in a hive. When left alone, the bees make honey: a community of prosperity. When their hive is attacked, they swarm out to defend it: a community of responsibility. Your village can do the same, but only if you are organized."

The course in Vung Tau was another link in the chain of events that began in 1967 with the election of Village Councils and Hamlet Chiefs

in 4,823 hamlets and 1,109 villages. Subsequently, off-year elections were held in most of the remaining villages and hamlets, so that currently there are elected Hamlet Chiefs in 10,400 of the 10,625 hamlets now officially recognized and elected Village Councils in 2,108 of the 2,164 villages.[1]

The government's message of promised autonomy was carried further when President Nguyen Van Thieu addressed the graduation of the first class of village and hamlet officials at Vung Tau:

"You are the ones who bear the burden of the war. You are the nation's first line of defense against the Communists. . . . Just as I am the President of the Republic, you are the Presidents of your communities."

Thieu recalled his campaign for election as Village Chief when he returned to his native village upon his graduation from high school at the end of World War II:

"There were three candidates: the pro-French candidate, the Communist candidate, and me. I was the only bachelor, so I campaigned among the mothers of eligible daughters. Of course, I won in a landslide."

That brought an appreciative laugh from the assembled group of local politicians, but Thieu's next line brought down the house:

"Those whiskey-drinking intellectuals in Saigon have no idea at all of your situation. When they criticize in their newspapers our efforts to restore you to your rightful place in society, I would like to clap them all in jail."

Cheering. Whistles. Stamping on the floor. Wizened old Village Chiefs with wispy beards clapping one another on the back. Not everyone, however,

picked up the gist of the President's appeal for village support. The following day both the Saigon press and the international news media headlined, "Thieu threatens to jail Saigon editors," with scant mention of the significance of the first meeting of village and hamlet leaders from throughout the country with a Chief of State who himself had been a Village Chief.

HISTORIC TENSION

The tension between village authority and the central state in Viet-Nam is so traditional that the phrase, phep vua thua le lang (the Emperor's orders yield to village custom), is known by every schoolboy. Although the village was never fully autonomous, it had been common practice since the sixteenth century for the villages to select their own leaders who acted as intermediaries between the village and the district chiefs appointed by the Emperor. In effect, the Emperor, through his mandarins, dealt with the villages as corporate entities.[2]

> Thus, if the village was to provide a contingent of recruits for the army, it was up to the village to decide the manner in which the young men would be selected; or, if the village was to pay a certain sum in taxes, the council of elders divided this sum to be paid among the inhabitants according to village custom. It is in this sense that the saying, phep vua thua le lang, should be taken. Village custom did not really block imperial orders; however, the imperial order was expected to stipulate only the ends desired; it was the prerogative of the village to find the means for realizing these ends. And it was precisely in recognizing this autonomy of the village that the state was able to impose on the village a collective responsibility for the execution of orders coming from the central government.[3]

The evolution of the traditional village council is of significance, since it illustrates certain central notions of codified legitimacy, local variation and self-determination, and the ethical foundations of government which

have given a cultural loading to the contemporary village and hamlet election process that is quite different from anything we know in the West.

> With an eye to developing local leadership, the inhabitants of the village were encouraged to meet in order to determine the moral and spiritual foundations of the community; these were inscribed in the village customary, or huong uoc (Chinese hsiang yueh), a tradition going back at least as far as the eleventh century. The customary often recalled Confucian principles: respect for elders, for scholars, for mandarins (either active or retired), and for retired cantonal and communal authorities. Due respect was evidenced by priorities given them in places of honor at village festivals or periodic meetings (huong am). These meetings were held in the communal house, or dinh (t'ing). The tradition gradually grew that the men tried to achieve the highest places of honor in the dinh. The men who occupied these places exercised in the commune, by the tacit agreement of all the inhabitants, an incontestable authority composed of an ingenious mixture of authority of confidence and authority of identification. It should be noted that, in order to arouse the interest of the inhabitants and to encourage them to participate actively in communal life, the greatest latitude was left to the villagers in the composition of the customary. In this way, certain customaries had greater respect for age (trong thien tuoc); others merely presented the order of precedence of the ranks of the mandarinate (trong hoan); others specified that academic degrees should take precedence (trong khoa).[4]

The traditional village councils persisted well into the French colonial period, with popularly-chosen councilors serving into this century.[5] But by this time events had been set in motion which would permanently alter the political environment in Viet-Nam and doom the traditional social order.

EROSION OF VILLAGE AUTONOMY

For the first dozen years following the signing of the Treaty of Protectorate in 1883, the French were not yet well-enough organized to systematically impose the kinds of administrative controls that would be meaningful at the village level. With the arrival of Paul Doumer as Governor General of French Indochina in December, 1896, things began to move. In order to provide the infrastructure for efficient extraction of Indochina's riches, Doumer initiated a massive public works program. To pay for it, he instituted a system of taxation that bypassed the village councils and directly taxed the citizen. Together with vastly increased indirect taxes, this innovation resulted in balancing the Tonkin budget within a single year of Doumer's arrival (compared with a net deficit of 168 million francs in the period 1887 - 1891).[6]

Another phenomenon destined to have great impact on village society had been accelerating ever since the French first established a foothold in Saigon in 1860. By their aggressive promotion of rice exports, the French had created a class of landlords and another of landless peasants (ta dien), a condition almost unknown in imperial times. Abetted by the introduction of a cash economy and direct taxation of the individual wage-earner, the pattern of land ownership in Cochinchina changed in two generations from small plots farmed by their proprietors to large holdings worked primarily by sharecroppers under landlord control.

> Between 1880 and 1930, the rice-land surface in Cochinchina more than quadrupled, but the average holding of a peasant was smaller in 1930 than before the coming of the French. And although considerably more rice was grown than ever before, the peasants' share continued to decline. The French wanted to produce as much rice as possible because export, chiefly to China and Japan, promised quick and large profits. Whereas in precolonial Vietnam

the export of rice had been forbidden, and the surpluses from the south sent to the deficit regions in the center and the north or stored, they were now sold. In 1860, when the French took control of Saigon harbor, 57,000 tons were exported; in 1877, the figure stood at 320,000. In 1937, rice exports reached 1.548 million tons. . . .

By 1938, 2.3 million of Cochinchina's 5.1 million hectares of arable land were under cultivation, and most of this cultivated area was held by 2.5 per cent of all landowners. The small rice peasants, 183,000 of them, constituted 70 per cent of all landholders, yet they owned only 15 per cent of the land. Still worse off were the 354,000 families of landless peasants, not to speak of the rural laborers.[7]

s important as the changing pattern of land tenure was the changing role the village council. The economic forces and administrative practices enerated by the French stripped the villager of the protection and secuty formerly offered by the communal leadership. The villager's vulrability was magnified by a confusing system of French legalist doctrine ich had been grafted on to the prevailing codes of Gia Long and Hong c,[8] complete "with its excessive proliferation of forms, procedures, d endless legal mysteries, which often bind the honest administrator nd and foot and, at the same time, shield or even encourage the neglince or the breaches of trust of the corrupt official."[9] What was abuntly clear was the narrowing scope of discretionary power left to the lage council that might enable it to act to maintain community stability d cohesiveness in the face of a rising tide of social inequities and disimination.

1903, Paul Beau, who had succeeded Doumer as Governor General of ench Indochina the previous year, had been persuaded that the village uncils were at the point of collapse.

A study committee was formed, and in 1904 its recommendation

provided the basis for legislation to create closer ties between the villages and the central administration. The result was that the village councils became smaller, and positions not viewed as administrative (those concerned with the Cult of the Guardian Spirit of the Village and village celebrations) were eliminated. Some of these sacred functions were absorbed by the cult committees, which emerged in every village subsequent to the legislation.[10]

Historically this was the first attempt to divide the ceremonial role of the village council from its administrative role. The response of the villages in creating cult committees (ban hoi huong) was a manifestation of the vitality of the traditional value system: deprived of one institution essential to the maintenance of the village cultural heritage, the villagers immediately created another.[11]

The thrust of the legislation reorganizing the village councils in 1904 was to forge them into an instrument for implementing the policies of the colonial administration. But by stripping the councils of their cultural function, the French unknowingly began the process of delegitimizing the councils. Additional legislation in 1927 giving provincial authorities control over village council membership and vesting supervisory powers over the other councilors in the First Notable effectively bureaucratized the council and completed its metamorphosis from a function of the community into a function of the state.[12]

Integration of the village council into the administrative control apparatus of the state caused councilors to assume the role of enforcing agents for administrative decisions made by inaccessible central authorities who, unlike the Emperors, were decidedly disinterested in maintaining the cultural stability and cohesiveness of the villages. Since all meaningful state decisions were controlled by the French for extractive benefit, participation in village council activities was tantamount to co-optation by the colonial interests. Such co-optation dovetailed neatly with the creation

of a privileged urban class who, through collaboration with the French, were able to exploit the situation to their economic advantage. The result was a web of corruption spun by landlords and usurers, in which the peasants were caught like hapless flies.

REVOLUTIONARY FLUX

> Take away the sign 人 (*man*) from the sign 囚 for *prison*,
> Add to it 或 (*probability*), that makes the word 國 (*nation*).
> Take the head-particle from the sign 患 for misfortune:
> That gives the word 忠 (*fidelity*).
> Add the sign 亻 for *man* (standing) to the sign 憂 for *worry*
> That gives the word 優 (*quality*).
> Take away the *bamboo* top 竹 from the sign 籠 for *prison*,
> That gives you 龍 (*dragon*).
>
> People who come out of prison can build up the country.
> Misfortune is a test of people's fidelity.
> Those who protest at injustice are people of true merit.
> When the prison doors are opened, the real dragon will fly out.[13]
>
> — Ho Chi Minh

Peasants, as Samuel Huntington has pointed out, "become revolutionary when their conditions of land ownership, tenancy, labor, taxes and prices become in their eyes unbearable."[14] It is hard to imagine conditions more conducive to a peasant-based revolution than those prevailing in Indochina in the 1930's. Characteristically, it was the Communists who saw the revolutionary potential most clearly, and it was certainly they who were best prepared to move into the vacuum created by the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II. Truong Chinh, then Secretary General of the Indochinese Communist Party, wrote in 1946:

> . . . The Indochinese Communist Party advocated an extremely clear policy: to lead the masses in insurrection in order to disarm the Japanese before the arrival of the Allied forces in Indo-China; to wrest

power from the Japanese and their puppet stooges and finally, as the people's power, to welcome the Allied forces coming to disarm the Japanese troops stationed in Indo-China. . . .

On August 16, the news of the Japanese surrender began to spread rapidly. In all provinces, huge public meetings accompanied by armed demonstrations were held in public thoroughfares. . . . The gold starred red flag was seen everywhere. . . .

On August 23, in Saigon-Cholon, a million of our compatriots demonstrated in the streets. The South Viet Nam Administrative Committee was founded. The vanguard youth and militia seized power in the provinces and united to form the revolutionary troops of the South of new Viet Nam.

One after another, from the cities to the rural areas, from the delta to the mountain regions, the elected People's Committees completely superseded the corrupt administrative machinery of mandarins and notables. In less than fifteen days, an entire new administrative machinery had been founded.

The prison doors were opened wide and political and common law prisoners were released by the revolutionary power. . . . The head tax was abolished. The former fiscal regime was gradually modified. Land rents were reduced, and communal rice fields distributed more equitably.[15]

Allowing for rhetoric, Truong Chinh's portrayal of the events of August, 945, seems to be as close to reality as any we have. It certainly reveals an objective appreciation of the conditions in the villages on which he coming struggle against the French could be based. Nor does the claim of extensive establishment of [revolutionary] village people's committees (uy ban nhan dan xa) seem to be wildly exaggerated. Hickey's assessment of a village area 55 kilometers south of Saigon gives a similar

account:

> . . . The Viet Minh seized control of the rural areas, organizing administrative committees in every village. The Administrative Committee in Khanh Hau consisted of six members — the chairman, two police agents, a public works secretary, a finance secretary, and a civil status secretary. All were selected from the Viet Minh cadre in the village, and although most were tenant farmers, the chairman and one of the police agents were brothers from a relatively well-to-do landowning family. Viet Minh control was short-lived, however; when the French re-established the colonial administration in January 1946, the former council was reinstated.[16]

hroughout Viet Nam, North, Central and South, there were significant reas where the emergence of the overt Viet Minh administrative mecha-ism was not nearly so ephemeral. And even where their presence was ıore apparent than real, the Viet Minh managed to implant the seeds of revolutionary vocabulary that were to yield some remarkably hardy utgrowths:

Viet Nam Doc Lap! Viet Nam Tu Do! Viet Nam Muon Nam!
/iet Nam Independent! Viet Nam Free! Viet Nam for a Thousand Years!)

owever heady, these slogans had a coalescing value only against the reign colonialist, which left the Communists in South Viet Nam with vo obstacles which eventually proved insurmountable: the Southerner's erception of them as agents of a Northern bid for territorial control, ıd effectively organized religio-political sects with secure constituencies. he success of the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai in preventing Communist en-roachment while remaining, for the most part, on the sidelines waiting r the French to leave the field suggests greater political adeptness than at for which they are usually given credit.

The Hoa Hao are not simply reformist Theravada Buddhists any more than the Cao Dai are simply eclectic occultists, although there is enough mystical content in the evolution and makeup of each to confuse the issue.[17] They are, however, regional phenomena of the post-World War I era that moved in to fill the cultural vacuum created by the deterioration of village leadership structures in western Cochinchina. They shared with the Communists (and with the Catholics and Buddhists, the only other socio-political groups in South Viet Nam with cohesive constituencies among ethnic Vietnamese) some interesting characteristics: a village base; a hierarchy organized laterally at the village level and vertically from village to district to province to central; some degree of upward mobility through the hierarchy for novitiates with talent; universal acceptance of adherents without regard for economic, educational or social distinctions; and most important, a professed devotion to an ethical value system backed up by a sophisticated apparatus for recruiting and indoctrinating converts.

In a sense, then, although the Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai, the Catholics and the Buddhists were avowedly religious groups, they in fact demonstrated a higher degree of political development than any of the other competing political groups, with the sole exception of the Communists, who shared with them what appears to be the set of characteristics required for achieving a cohesive constituency in Viet Nam:

1. A village base; the village is the operating mechanism in the culture, hence it is the level at which the basic unit of the political system must be organized.

2. A hierarchy organized laterally at the village level, and vertically from village to district to province to central; the system must be able to communicate with the mass base so that it can discharge its functions through effectively channelling inputs and outputs.

3. Some degree of upward mobility through the hierarchy for

novitiates with talent; not only does this prevent the structures of the system from becoming senescent, roles from becoming inappropriate to their functions, and the appearance of closed access from becoming a disincentive to recruitment, it provides a means of assuring that the system remains in touch with its cultural base and that the channels for interest articulation and aggregation remain open, alert and functional.

4. Universal acceptance of adherents without regard for economic, educational or social distinctions; whether regarding the system as a whole or any of its constituent subsystems, failure to incorporate diverse elements of the culture in which the system or subsystem must function will lead inevitably to isolation, senescence and disfunction.

5. A professed devotion to an ethical value system backed up by a sophisticated apparatus for recruiting and indoctrinating converts; Vietnamese culture is predicated on a pact with a collective, ethical destiny: meeting the fundamental criteria for acculturation requires structures for political socialization consistent with a value system that is legitimate and relevant to the people.

No political party or group other than the Buddhists, the Catholics, the Communists, the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai emerged during the Viet Minh period or during the revolutionary flux since partition that encompasses these five criteria for political legitimacy, hence it should be no surprise that these five groups are still the only ones with anything like a cohesive grass-roots constituency.

The fact that each of these groups, within and of itself, fulfills all of the normative political functions: political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication, rule-making, rule application and rule adjudication clarifies the aggressive manner in which each attempts to dominate the polity, either regionally,

as the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai, or nationally, as the Catholics, Buddhists and Communists are attempting to do. It should also explain the tenacity and resilience each has shown in competing with the others.

Judged by these criteria, the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem was an unmitigated disaster for political development in South Viet Nam. Diem almost began his presidency with the dissolution of the village councils and their reconstitution in practically a mirror image of the Viet Minh councils:

> The communal administration was reduced to its simplest expression, since it was constituted by a village council (hoi dong xa) made up of three persons, the representative of the commune (dai dien xa), the police councilor (uy vien canh sat), and the finance councilor (uy vien tai chanh), all appointed by the province chief upon the recommendation of the district chief. In some cases there was a fourth member, the youth councilor (uy vien thann nien), who, unlike the other three, was formally elected by the young people of the village. The larger villages were by exception provided two additional councilors.[18]

It would seem that Diem was almost writing off the villages. Dennis Duncanson put it most succinctly when discussing the conception of the strategic hamlet program:

> Perhaps even more weight in the framing of the strategic-hamlet 'programme' in Ngo Dinh Nhu's mind came from the conviction that the age-old problem of village administration was insoluble: if the village commune (the xa) could be bypassed and left to wither, the much smaller hamlet, especially in Cochinchina, stood a better chance of self-defence on a lien-gia or neighborhood [inter-family] basis— less open to treachery— and also of political domination from the capital, for entire hamlets could be set to watch one another and the village neutralized.[19]

By 1963, after millions of people had been uprooted from their homes, it was apparent even to Nhu and Diem that all was not well with the strategic hamlets. The Ministry of Interior produced a new order resurrecting the official status of the village:

> After seven years of experience with a provisional administration, Decree No. 45/NV, dated May 3, 1963, defined the general outlines of the communal administrative organization. The commune continued to be the basic administrative unit, but included an official subdivision, the ap, or hamlet. The administration of the commune rested in the hands of the hoi dong xa, or communal council (Article 4 of Decree No. 45/NV), which included: the dai dien xa (representative of the commune), the hoi vien kinh te va tai chanh (economic and financial councilor), the hoi vien canh sat (police councilor), the hoi vien thanh nien (youth councilor), and the hoi vien ho tich va y te cong dong (councilor for the registry and for public health).
>
> The administrative work of the council was the responsibility of the thu ky xa (communal clerk), although in communes of more than 5,000 inhabitants, a maximum of three additional clerks could be employed to assist the council.
>
> The communal council was elected by secret ballot by the members of the administrative councils of the ap (hamlets), and by the leaders of the groups recognized by the customaries of the hamlets. This amounted to election by indirect suffrage, since the electors were themselves elected by direct universal suffrage. The only exception was the youth councilor, who was elected by the leaders of the youth groups. All these elections were closely supervised by the district chief, to avoid irregularities, and had to be approved by the province chief. It should be noted that no special conditions of eligibility were prescribed, except the general current ones: majority, no criminal convictions in court, residence in the commune for at least a year, and so on.[20]

VILLAGE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
per Decrees #198 (4 December 1966) and #045 (1 April 1969)



(Figure 1.)

In a stroke the government had relegitimized the essential village leadership structure, but it was a case of too little, too late. By the time the new decree could be implemented, the Ngo regime was in extremis.

After the overthrow of Diem, the village council was altered by the Revolutionary Government in Decree No. 203d/NV dated 31 May 1964, to elect village councilors on the basis of hamlet constituencies and to "have an administrative committee (uy ban hanh chanh xa) appointed by the province chief and composed of a chairman (who [was] also the communal clerk), a vice-chairman, and from one to four commissioners: for police and security, finance and economy, information, and youth and civil defense."[21]

On 4 December 1966, per Decree No. 198, the government reorganized the council to include 6 to 12 councilors, depending on the population of the village, who are elected at large by direct vote. Hamlet chiefs, also, are elected at large in their hamlets by direct vote. The village council, at its first meeting after being elected, elects from among their number, the village chief. The village chief is the executive officer for the council, whose orders he carries out through an expanded administrative committee (see Figure 1), per Decree No. 045 of 1 April 1969.

All principal officers in the village leadership structures, save the members of the cult committee, are now elected by the people of their constituency, and they must stand for reelection every three years.

Not only are the principle leadership roles within the village now filled by elected officials, but the scope of action of those officials has been significantly expanded to include direct command of the local militia and the territorial security forces stationed at their level. Thus, for the first time, the village has direct control of troops.

SUMMARY: INITIAL CONCLUSIONS

If the roles to which successful candidates for village and hamlet office are elected are meaningful and relevant to themselves and their constituents, it can be deduced that village and hamlet elections are a useful means of political socialization ;

However, the roles, if they are not to be considered co-optation, must be integral with a successful political system;

A successful political system in Viet Nam has several salient characteristics, among them: a village base, a hierarchy organized laterally at the village level and vertically from village to district to province to central, some degree of upward mobility through the hierarchy for novitiates with talent, universal acceptance of adherents without regard for economic, educational or social distinctions, and a professed devotion to an ethical value system backed up by a sophisticated apparatus for recruiting and indoctrinating converts;

Village government is beginning to evidence incipient aspects of most of these characteristics , and especially as citizens gain confidence in their ability to turn out of office undesirable or nonperforming incumbents and replace them with candidates more representative of the prevailing village value system, the electoral process will gain validity;

Increasing the authority and scope of action of the village polity will in all likelihood accelerate the pace at which candidates of worth can be recruited and absorbed productively into the system, which in turn will accelerate the pace at which the electoral process will become internalized in the village culture.

CAVEAT

It will become increasingly apparent that the village polity is an open system, and in fact the national polity is dependent on a village constituency. It is not unlikely that a national coalition of village leadership

will, with time and encouragement of the dominant socio-political groups (the Catholics, Buddhists, Communists) emerge and play an increasingly important role. Such leaders will be culturally distinguishable from the present leadership classes, and the latter can be predicted to coalesce increasingly along class/cultural lines. With increasing potential for urban instability among those who arrived in the urban areas without productive economic skills, there is some potential for a second generation insurgency set off by sudden reversals of national policy manifested in attempted suppression of a militant rural/urban village coalition.

Reston, Virginia
8 December 1971

NOTES:

[1] Ben Ferguson, "Report of Village and Hamlet Election Results -- 1967 through 1971," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support/Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam, 23 November 1971.

[2] Nghiem Dang, Viet-Nam: Politics and Public Administration (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966), p. 149. Professor Nghiem Dang is Vice-Rector of the National Institute of Administration in Saigon.

[3] Ibid., p. 150.

[4] Ibid., pp. 148-149.

[5] Gerald C. Hickey, Village in Viet-Nam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 179.

[6] Joseph Buttinger, Viet-Nam: A Political History (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 112-113.

[7] Ibid., pp. 163-164.

[8] Dennis J. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Viet-Nam (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 94-95.

[9] Nghiem Dang, op. cit., p. 61.

[10] Hickey, op., cit., p. 179.

[11] Ibid., p. 214.

[12] Ibid., pp. 179-181.

[13] Ho Chi Minh, On Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920-66 (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 137.

[14] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Dimensions of Land Reform," AID Spring Review of Land Reform, June 1970, p. 5.

[15] Truong Chinh, The August Revolution (1946), rpt. in Primer for Revolt (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 14-16.

[16] Hickey, op.. cit., p. 181.

[17] Duncanson, op. cit., pp. 120-122, 125-127.

[18] Nghiem Dang, op. cit., p. 154.

[19] Duncanson, op. cit., p. 314.

[20] Nghiem Dang, op. cit., p. 156.

[21] Ibid., p. 157.